Israel-UAE trade will overtake deals with Egypt
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The agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Israel to normalise their relations, described by some as a “peace” deal, seems to have hit a snag over weapons purchases. The UAE is keen to join the exclusive club of nations allowed to buy F-35 fighter jets; in exchange for allowing the transaction to proceed, Israel is seeking additional US weapon systems.
For those with a long memory, this all sounds very familiar. Egypt’s 1979 treaty with Israel was also attended by questions over weapons purchases. Indeed, President Anwar Sadat’s decision to make peace helped pave Egyptian access to US arms and military aid after he had downgraded ties with the Soviet Union and expelled Soviet military advisers. The two deals have something else in common: they reduced pressure for a peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
But the echoes between them don’t travel much farther than that. While normalisation between Israel and the UAE is expected to lead to substantial trade between both countries, there was no such windfall for the first Arab nation to officially recognise Israel. Four decades after the historic peace treaty, economic relations between the signatories are mainly limited to some high profile natural-gas deals and Israeli tourism to Egypt.
This contributes to the common characterisation of Israeli-Egyptian relations as a “cold peace” rather than a genuine friendship: co-operation and engagement between them has been limited. The reasons for this can be traced back to the historical trajectories and motivations that brought about the 1979 treaty.
The two countries had been at war with each other four times in the three preceding decades. Egyptian and Israeli families had lost loved ones in the fighting. On each side, military and security agencies were used to regarding the other as a threat. The treaty allowed both countries to secure increased financial support from the US while ending any serious risk of another war, but it never fully dissolved the distrust between them.
Throughout the negotiations and since the signing of the treaty, Egypt deepened its economic relations with the West, securing growing sums of aid, loans and investments. While Egyptian and Israeli governments developed robust security co-operation, there was little interest in building deep economic ties.
The US tried to address this by establishing Qualified Industrial Zones in Egypt in 2004 that allowed duty-free access to the US market for goods produced with at least 10.5% Israeli input, but ...
For those with a long memory, this all sounds very familiar. Egypt’s 1979 treaty with Israel was also attended by questions over weapons purchases. Indeed, President Anwar Sadat’s decision to make peace helped pave Egyptian access to US arms and military aid after he had downgraded ties with the Soviet Union and expelled Soviet military advisers. The two deals have something else in common: they reduced pressure for a peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
But the echoes between them don’t travel much farther than that. While normalisation between Israel and the UAE is expected to lead to substantial trade between both countries, there was no such windfall for the first Arab nation to officially recognise Israel. Four decades after the historic peace treaty, economic relations between the signatories are mainly limited to some high profile natural-gas deals and Israeli tourism to Egypt.
This contributes to the common characterisation of Israeli-Egyptian relations as a “cold peace” rather than a genuine friendship: co-operation and engagement between them has been limited. The reasons for this can be traced back to the historical trajectories and motivations that brought about the 1979 treaty.
The two countries had been at war with each other four times in the three preceding decades. Egyptian and Israeli families had lost loved ones in the fighting. On each side, military and security agencies were used to regarding the other as a threat. The treaty allowed both countries to secure increased financial support from the US while ending any serious risk of another war, but it never fully dissolved the distrust between them.
Throughout the negotiations and since the signing of the treaty, Egypt deepened its economic relations with the West, securing growing sums of aid, loans and investments. While Egyptian and Israeli governments developed robust security co-operation, there was little interest in building deep economic ties.
The US tried to address this by establishing Qualified Industrial Zones in Egypt in 2004 that allowed duty-free access to the US market for goods produced with at least 10.5% Israeli input, but ...